Debunking the Myth that Military Strategies Don't Work Against Terrorism

It's been a popular refrain, since the beginning of Israel's decision to fight back in late March 2002 with the initiation of Operation Defensive Shield, that there are no military solutions to terrorism. Well, there may not be any perfect solutions, but five years later, the evidence overwhelming points to the success of Israel's military/intelligence strategies. The combination of good intelligence, the IDF's physical presence (including roadblocks), targeted killings of terror chieftans, bombmakers, engineers, etc., and the construction of large sections of the separation barrier, has brought the toll of Israeli civilian and military casualties down to a remarkably low level, when compared with those numbers at the height of the second Intifada, before these tactics were implemented. In 2002, the single worst year of terrorism, Israel suffered 450 deaths attributable to Palestinian terrorism. Today, the last 'successful' suicide bombing inside Israel took place a year and a half ago. Since the beginning of 2007, two soldiers and six Israeli citizens (three in a suicide bombing in Eilat, two from Qassam rockets in Sderot, and one who was stabbed to death in the Etzion bloc in the West Bank) have been killed as a result of terrorism. While tragic, these are minor numbers, especially considering the number of attempts made by Palestinians at carrying out attacks.
True, the military option is not a permanent solution to the conflict, but it is an important tool, actually creating an environment where real diplomatic progress can be achieved. It is only after the Palestinians understand that terrorism is actually counterproductive to their goal of statehood, that movement towards a diplomatic solution can be reached.
david brumer
seattle

It's Possible to Defeat Terrorism - Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff
It's common to claim it is impossible to defeat terrorism. But over the years of combating Palestinian terrorism during the second intifada, the IDF and the Shin Bet have reached the closest possible point to achieving a victory. Since the beginning of the year, two soldiers and six Israeli citizens were killed as a result of terrorism. At the high point of the intifada, 450 Israelis were killed in 2002. The last suicide bombing in central Israel occurred 18 months ago, in April 2006. The winning formula is a combination of aggressive intelligence-gathering by the Shin Bet, the obstacle created by the separation fence, and the complete freedom of operations granted to the IDF in the Palestinian cities. (Ha'aretz)
The West Bank operation / A reminder of a forgotten war
By Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff
The death of a soldier from an elite unit yesterday in Nablus was a reminder of a forgotten war. The endless wait for the Winograd Committee report - and the political capital the prime minister has received in opinion polls published in recent days - have drawn the attention of most Israelis away from the daily warfare that is taking place less than an hour from the center of the country. In recent months, the West Bank and Gaza Strip security forces have arrested hundreds of militants and foiled dozens of terrorist attacks. Only the fact that yesterday the IDF suffered its first fatality this year in the West Bank has returned the focus on what is taking place on that front.
It's common to claim it is impossible to defeat terrorism. But over the years of combating Palestinian terrorism during the second intifada (this month marks the seventh anniversary), the IDF and the Shin Bet have reached the closest possible point to achieving a victory. Since the beginning of the year, two soldiers (one each in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) and six Israeli citizens (three in a suicide bombing in Eilat, two from Qassam rockets in Sderot, and one who was stabbed to death in the Etzion bloc in the West Bank) were killed as a result of terrorism. These are very minor figures, considering the number of attempts at carrying out attacks, and also when compared to the high point of the intifada, when 450 Israelis were killed in 2002. The last suicide bombing in central Israel occurred 18 months ago, in April 2006, in the old central bus station in Tel Aviv. The winning formula is a combination of aggressive intelligence gathering by the Shin Bet, the obstacle created by the separation fence and the complete freedom of operations granted to the IDF in the Palestinian cities. The army considers the continued arrests of militants and the main roadblocks as essential tools for successfully combating terrorism. Defense Minister Ehud Barak said yesterday that if he had to choose between easing restrictions on Palestinians and security considerations, he would opt for the latter.

The "Nonexistent" Military Solution? - Evelyn Gordon
In March 2002, Israel reconquered the West Bank in Operation Defensive Shield - and Israeli fatalities dropped dramatically, that year and every year thereafter. In 1993, many Israelis hoped that a peace agreement would end terror. Fourteen years later, after having suffered more fatalities from Palestinian terror post-Oslo than during the entire preceding 45 years, most Israelis have concluded that the allegedly nonexistent military solution does a much better job of protecting their lives. And until there is concrete evidence of Palestinian willingness and ability to do the job as well or better, there will be no Israeli majority for any deal with the PA.

The fact that Israel first sought nonmilitary solutions in Gaza resembles its behavior during the first 18 months of the intifada: It signed cease-fires (which instantly collapsed), declined to respond even to major suicide bombings inside Israel (Dolphinarium and Sbarro), and generally sought to get the Palestinian security services to reassert control. But as the casualty toll, especially inside Israel, mounted, it became clear that salvation would not come from the PA. So in March 2002, Israel reconquered the West Bank in Operation Defensive Shield - and Israeli fatalities dropped dramatically, that year and every year thereafter.
However, there is one crucial difference between the intifada's early years and the recent Israeli quest for a nonmilitary solution in Gaza: While Israelis would always prefer to avoid risking soldiers' lives, they now know, as they did not in 2002, that the military option works. After all, not a single Kassam has been fired at Israel from the West Bank. Hence Israelis are not awaiting leadership from above; they are backing military action even as the politicians still vehemently reject it.
Given this growing recognition among the Israeli public, it is bizarre to hear senior politicians and military officers still parroting the "no military solution to terror" mantra. But at least these officials understand that in practice, Israel's defensive measures in the West Bank work, and therefore, ending them would be a bad idea (not to mention unpopular with the voters).
International agencies and diplomats, in contrast, have not even gotten that far. Any of them could, if they took five minutes to examine the data, realize that Israel's military measures in the West Bank have dramatically reduced Israeli fatalities, especially inside Israel, since 2002; yet they persist in declaring that these measures are unnecessary and must be scrapped. Thus Condoleezza Rice uses her every visit to pressure Israel on this issue, while the World Bank once again demanded last week that Israel remove West Bank checkpoints, open its border with Gaza and restore freedom of movement between Gaza and the West Bank.
Or perhaps this is feigned ignorance, meant to cover a willingness to sacrifice Israeli lives in order to demonstrate "progress" in the peace process. The World Bank report, for instance, coyly stated that "the costs are subjective to each side and are beyond the scope of this report" - thereby sparing it the need to acknowledge that the likely cost is Israeli lives - but "all parties will need to expend more resources and assume more risks than they have done in the past."
Is it really unaware of what those carefully unstated risks are?
Either way, however, this willful blindness perpetuates the conflict by ensuring that a key obstacle to resolving it - Palestinian terror - remains unaddressed. In 1993, many Israelis hoped that a peace agreement would end terror. Fourteen years later, after having suffered more fatalities from Palestinian terror post-Oslo than during the entire preceding 45 years, most Israelis have concluded that the allegedly nonexistent military solution does a much better job of protecting their lives. And until there is concrete evidence of Palestinian willingness and ability to do the job as well or better, there will be no Israeli majority for any deal with the PA.