The Art of Statecraft: How Messages are Internalized

One of the conundrums of modern diplomacy is how to foster progress in difficult regions like the ME without sending the wrong message to dangerous non-State actors like Hezbollah, Hamas, and Al-Qaeda. Dennis Ross points out that we have to exercise our power intelligently, and not automatically grant recognition to non-State actors. While negotiations should never be ruled out, we should be careful in not conferring legitimacy to these organizations without a price: namely, playing by the minimum rules of the game of the civilized world. Groups like Hamas "should have to adjust to the world, not the other way around".

In a similar vein, Dore Gold reminds us, "Forty years ago when U.N. Resolution 242 was drafted, its architects understood that peacemaking required balance. Israel would have to compromise, but its diplomacy should not undermine the delicate strategic balance in the Middle East with a radical pullout that would leave it excessively vulnerable. Effective diplomacy today requires striking the same careful balance--seizing opportunities for real peace, but granting Israel its right to defensible borders."
The messages we send by our actions as well as our words are quickly internalized and exploited by those parties in the ME whose interest lie not in peace-making, but in gobbling up more territories in their inexorable pursuit of a worldwide Muslim Caliphate. Indonesia: Islamic Caliphate Conference to Attract 100,000 (AKI-Italy)
david brumer


Good Statecraft Treats State and Non-State Actors Differently - Dennis Ross

Negotiations confer recognition. For that reason, it is essential to draw a distinction between states like Iran or Syria and non-state actors like Hizbullah and Hamas. For non-state actors, recognition is a major achievement. It creates legitimacy, builds momentum and creates a sense of inevitability about the achievement of their agendas. None of this should be given for free. Thus, while I am not prepared to exclude direct negotiations or meetings as a tool of statecraft with states, it is essential to treat non-state actors differently. Take the example of Hamas, a non-state actor now dominant in Gaza. There is a need to avoid a humanitarian crisis. But if Hamas wants developmental assistance or investment coming to Gaza, they should have to play by the basic rules of the game - one of which is stopping attacks against Israel. Hamas should have to adjust to the world, not the other way around. (Daily Star-Lebanon)

America's Latest Efforts Merely Entrenched Al-Qaeda in Gaza - Dore Gold (Wall Street Journal)
Pushing Israel back to the pre-1967 lines will not satisfy al Qaeda, nor will it bring peace. Right now, what the Palestinians need is help to build a stable civil society with governing institutions that work, not a return to the ceremonial diplomacy of the 1990s. The errors of past Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking have not been cost-free. They have real consequences in terms of loss of life and a deepening conflict. These initiatives do not halt the assault of radical Islam against the West. In fact, if mishandled, they can make it far worse.
In short, the U.S. and its Western allies thought that Israel's Gaza pullout would establish the foundations of a Palestinian state and thus reduce the flames of radical Islamic rage. Instead they got an al-Qaeda sanctuary on the shores of the Mediterranean.
The source of their error was a popular misconception in policy-making circles of what causes radical Islam to thrive. The gasoline fueling al Qaeda has been its sense of victory, not political grievances.
It should be remembered that in the 1990s, the U.S. and its allies addressed many political grievances of the Islamic world in Kuwait, Somalia and especially in Bosnia. In the Arab-Israeli sector, the Clinton administration devoted more time to Arab-Israeli diplomacy than most of its predecessors, with the 1993 Oslo Accords, the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, the 1997 Hebron Agreement, the 1998 Wye Agreement, and finally the attempt to reach a permanent-status agreement at Camp David in 2000. But al Qaeda only grew in strength. There were attacks in Saudi Arabia in 1995, East Africa in 1998, Yemen in 2000 and finally 9/11.
In other words, there was no correlation between U.S.-led diplomatic efforts to ameliorate the grievances voiced by radical Islamic groups and the appeal of al Qaeda.
The U.S. and other Western powers are pushing for a new Israeli-Palestinian breakthrough to help contain Iran and undercut the appeal of al-Qaeda and radical Islam. The underlying assumption is that radical Islam has something do to with Israel-related political grievances. But is this really the case?
In August 2005, the U.S. and its Western allies thought that Israel's Gaza pullout would establish the foundations of a Palestinian state and thus reduce the flames of radical Islamic rage. Instead they got an al-Qaeda sanctuary on the shores of the Mediterranean.
What the Gaza pullout showed was that mishandling the Israeli-Palestinian issue can exacerbate the threat of radical Islam, especially if it deepens the sense in radical Islamic circles that their military efforts have paid off. The gasoline fueling al-Qaeda has been its sense of victory, not political grievances. In the 1990s, the Clinton administration devoted more time to Arab-Israeli diplomacy than most of its predecessors, arranging numerous diplomatic agreements. But al-Qaeda only grew in strength. In other words, there was no correlation between U.S.-led diplomatic efforts to ameliorate the grievances voiced by radical Islamic groups and the appeal of al-Qaeda.
The writer, Israel's ambassador to the UN in 1997-99, is President of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and author of The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and the Future of the Holy City (Regnery, 2007).